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SUBJECT: Roeland Van de Geer Briefs MONUC, International
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¶1. (SBU) Summary: Meeting with MONUC and the international facilitation October 17, EU Great Lakes Envoy Roeland van de Geer said that National Assembly President Vital Kamerhe had recently been more open to FARDC/CNDP bilateral talks on military issues. Kamerhe added that political talks could follow, but they must go slowly and with some CNDP gestures of good will. Van de Geer said that unless a meeting on the political or military level was held soon, he would consider calling for a high-level emergency meeting -- to include A/S Frazier and French Foreign Minister Kouchner -- before the November 10 special envoys' meeting in Nairobi. End Summary.

Goma Process

¶2. (SBU) EU Great Lakes Envoy Roeland Van de Geer met with MONUC and the international facilitation on October 17. He said he had recently spoken to National Assembly President Vital Kamerhe, who, according to Van de Geer, is now open to direct bilateral talks between the CNDP and the FARDC on military issues, such as disengagement and a ceasefire. Kamerhe was also more open to a political dialog with the CNDP. Kamerhe cautioned, however, that the process would have to start slowly, and should include some gestures of good faith from the CNDP on the military side, especially since the FARDC had withdrawn from Tongo. Kamerhe opined that General John Numbi -- one of three possible interlocutors mentioned by Nkunda -- might be a good interlocutor for Nkunda. Kamerhe added that he would first need to confer with President Kabila.

¶3. (SBU) Van de Geer said that the CNDP might be more willing to discuss military issues, if it was confident political negotiations would follow soon afterwards. Van de Geer will continue to urge the CNDP to return to the Amani Program, even if this would be in the form of bilateral talks. (Note: some MONUC contacts expressed skepticism that this was the best approach. They argued that, because Amani was such anathema to Nkunda, it would be better not to formally insist on continuing with Amani, while privately understanding that the objectives of bilateral talks would be identical to those in Amani. End Note.) FARDC General Lukama, who has consistently expressed his willingness to meet with the CNDP (reftel), now believes that any re-engagement should await the formation of a new government in Kinshasa. Van de Geer said that, if a meeting at the military or political levels did not occur soon, he would consider calling for a high-level emergency meeting before the next special envoys' meeting November 10 in Nairobi. Van de Geer said he would hope to have A/S Frazier and French Foreign Minister Kouchner attend such a meeting.

Nairobi Process

14. (SBU) Van de Geer stressed that the current impasse between the GOR and GDRC had resulted in the cancellation of the October 17 JMG meeting. Colonel Mamba from the Congolese delegation said he would need explicit instructions from Special Envoy Ngwej before he would go to a JMG meeting in Gisenyi again. Van de Geer said that he had not been able to discuss this with Ngwej, as Ngwej had been in Quebec for the Francophonie Summit. The Rwandans continued to insist that the security situation in Goma precluded a meeting for them in Goma. At the same time, however, the Rwandans were reportedly insisting on an official request from either Van de Geer's or Ngwej's office to hold the meeting in Gisenyi.

15. (SBU) Brainstorming about possible solutions that Van de Geer could bring on his October 20 visit to Kigali, he and the international facilitation agreed that Goma remained the preferred location for JMG meetings, followed by Gisenyi and Bukavu, although Bukavu would be logistically challenging. Van de Geer agreed to present the Rwandans with two "out-of-the-box" proposals: a meeting either on Idjwi Island or on a boat on Lake Kivu.

16. (SBU) In Van de Geer's view, the November 10 special envoys' meeting in Nairobi would still take place despite GOR-GDRC tensions. The EU will present, after input from other task forces members, a one-year evaluation of the Nairobi Process. Van de Geer asked whether the U.S. would take over the chair of the JMG at the envoy level. He added that the EU could continue in the chair in the event a change in the Administration would make it more difficult for the U.S. to assume this role.

17. (SBU) Comment: The November 10 special envoys' meeting will be an important opportunity to inject new life into the Nairobi

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Process. The frustrating reality is that the JMG Task Force has been doing all the right things in monitoring the Nairobi implementation on a technical level, but there is little to show in terms of concrete progress in disarming the FDLR. End Comment.

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